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To tolerate or recognize any combination of . . . employees of the Government as a
labor organization or union is not only incompatible with the spirit of democracy, but
inconsistent with every principle upon which our Government is founded.
Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy (1943);
CIO v. City of Dallas (1946) n1
The court, of course, knows what a labor union is . . .
King v. Priest (1947) n2
 [*981]   
Why and how American public sector labor law evolved as it did - separate from and much
more restrictive than private sector law - is an important, fertile, and strangely ignored subject. Of
most obvious instrumental importance, the glacier of frozen judicial rules that traditionally
regulated government employment artificially obstructed the growth of public sector unions at least
to the 1960s, thus affecting the entire labor movement and American society. While the National
Labor Relations  [*982]  Act of 1935 (NLRA) n3 gave basic protections to private sector unions, no
federal law ever covered public sector labor relations. Up to the 1960s, under court-made law,
public sector unions generally had no right to strike, bargain, or arbitrate disputes, and government
workers could be fired simply for joining a union. From the 1960s to today, more than half the
states have passed statutes which provide some statutory rights for public sector unions, and courts
finally have concluded that firing public workers for joining unions violates constitutional rights to
associate. n4 With the glacier finally beginning to melt, the rate of unionization in government
employment skyrocketed from about ten percent in the 1960s to nearly forty percent in the 1990s: a
stark contrast to declining rates in the private sector. n5 Public sector unions now occupy prominent
places in the AFL-CIO and in American politics. The critical role that law played in facilitating
these stunning developments is clear, yet this leads to the question: Why was the development of
public sector labor delayed and deformed for so long? This question has remained unexplored,
despite a wealth of important and fascinating studies of the history of private sector labor law. n6
 [*983]  Answering this question not only deepens our understanding of a significant body of
law, but also offers an excellent case study of how law develops and sheds light on modern legal
problems. As to modern issues, first, especially in the many states that still lack public sector labor
statutes, key doctrines of the old legal regime still exert considerable force. n7 Second, recent
constitutional litigation has revived doctrinal issues that never went away in public employment:
limits on the delegation of government power and federalism. While federal courts abandoned non-
delegation doctrine from the New Deal until recently, it has always been a live issue in state court
public sector labor cases. n8 Federalism, too, has enjoyed renewed judicial and scholarly interest.
n9 Many of these cases involve the application of employment laws to public employees. n10 But
federalism has always been central to public sector law. It helps explain why the National Labor
Relations Act could not have covered public employees and why public sector unions today still
have only limited statutory rights in only some areas of the country. Related issues  [*984]  of the
division of power within individual states help explain why, in the absence of statutes, courts
limited the rights of these unions so greatly.
Further, and central to this Article, the history of public sector labor law provides an
illuminating example of why law develops as it does. Private sector labor law has long been a
source of raw materials in such inquiries, n11 but the public sector raises two fundamental questions
these studies do not answer. First, why did judges continue to deny to public sector unions the most
basic labor rights for so long after the NLRA? Second, why did statutory protections not even begin
to cover parts of the public sector in America until decades after the NLRA and after other,
comparable countries had provided much greater protections for government workers? n12 Recent
scholarship has developed new and sophisticated tools for answering such questions, i.e., for
understanding causation in the evolution of legal doctrine. Yet the very wealth of disparate ideas,
and understandable caution about oversimplification, has too often led to accounts of causation
which leave the actual reasons for legal developments too vague or cluttered with factors to be
satisfying. n13 As Morton Horwitz ruefully asked in his most recent volume on legal history, "How
does one explain anything objectively in a world of complex, multiple causation?" n14
This Article provides an example of such an explanation by critically examining the history of
public sector labor law in the first half of the twentieth century. It shows that this body of law can
be understood by synthesizing some of the most important insights of new and old schools of legal
historiography: the legal realist stress on judicial bias against unions; the methodology of law and
society scholars in looking beyond federal appellate court decisions; the concern of the legal
process school that courts follow neutral rules; the critical theorist insight on the importance of
competing "constructions" of terms in legal discourse; and the "new institutionalist" emphasis on
the  [*985]  importance of state structures and capacity. This Article, therefore, argues for a model
of causation in legal history which synthesizes insights from different and sometimes competing
historiographical schools, a model which neither depends entirely on one simplistic causal factor
nor involves so many considerations as to be incoherent.
Part I briefly shows that causation has been an increasingly difficult problem for legal
historians. Part II parses judicial opinions in public sector labor cases, analyzing the individual
factors driving these cases, contrasting private sector law, and pointing out the continuing relevance
of some old doctrines of public sector law. It shows that different schools of legal historiography
can, together, explain public sector law, and also that this area of law can enhance the insights of the
different schools. Part II, Section A shows that, as legal realists argued, courts were often simply
hostile to unions generally, and that such hostility included unions of government workers. But
since courts continued to endorse broad prohibitions on public sector labor for decades after they
had at least grudgingly accepted private sector unions, this section concludes that other factors were
at play.
Sections B and C of Part II bring more recent theoretical tools to bear on the public sector.
Section B uses a "new institutionalist" approach, investigating the role of state structure in legal
developments. It argues that judges promoted a consistent conception of the powers of different
arms of state governments that was particularly harmful to labor. Specifically, courts decided that
they should defer to highly localized government bodies in labor matters, with the crucial caveat
that such local officials did not have the power to "delegate" public authority to private bodies
through bargaining or arbitration. Section C shows that, consistent with some critical discourse
theory, judicial construction of the term "union" was crucial. Although contemporary unionists
contested this judicial construction, renouncing strikes and bargaining in word and deed, courts
"knew" that "union" could only mean groups that negotiated with and struck against capitalist
bosses. Thus public workers could not be "unions" under statutes granting rights to unions, and no
"union" could be permitted in the belly of the government. Part II, Section D demonstrates that all
these factors worked together to yield a consistent theme: courts would not force government
officials  [*986]  to deal with "unions" as judges understood that term; in fact, such officials lacked
the authority to do so.
Part III discusses the curious absence of statutory protections in the public sector. It shows not
only how federalism precluded any national public sector labor statute, but also why no state
statutes protected public sector labor through the end of the 1950s. It argues that a fear of strikes,
again based on judicial misconstructions, was also central. Part IV concludes with the lessons public
sector labor law teaches about causation.
I
CAUSATION: "HOW DOES ONE EXPLAIN ANYTHING?"
Questions concerning causation - why and how law develops - are controversial and difficult,
but also fundamental to legal scholarship. In broad brush, modern debates began with legal realists,
who rejected the classical notion that judicial reasoning was or even could be a science. As to
causation, realists often pointed to the political and other biases of judges. n15 The "law and
society" approach, identified first with Willard Hurst and later with Lawrence Friedman and Kermit
Hall, agreed that politics mattered, but it looked beyond the "mandarin texts" of appellate court
decisions on which the realists relied. Explaining legal developments meant examining the records
of administrative bodies, private litigants, and broad social trends. n16 For Hurst, the causation
question centered on "the relationship of human agency and social structure." n17 Lawrence
Friedman insisted that what is "crucial is the relationship of law to 'general values and process'...."
n18 The more doctrinally-based legal process school emerged in the 1950s, based on the works of
Herbert Wechsler, Henry Hart, Jr., and Albert Sacks. It shifted the focus  [*987]  back to traditional
legal texts and internal, "neutral" rules in explaining how judges should and did operate. n19 More
recently, structuralist and then post-structuralist Critical Legal Studies (CLS) n20 scholars and
others have laudably engaged in serious interdisciplinary efforts to borrow or adapt new theoretical
and methodological approaches used by historians, political scientists, and linguists. n21 In so
doing, they encountered a theoretical storm in the humanities over issues of causation that is still
very much alive. n22
As legal historians became more facile with these diverse and complex approaches they
increasingly found older causal models wanting. Christopher Tomlins and Michael Grossberg
pilloried the metaphor, which law and society scholars Friedman and Hall used, that law was a
"mirror" of society, arguing that this image was unhelpful in sorting out causation. n23 Critical legal
scholars also deviated from traditional norms of progressive or left-leaning  [*988]  scholarship by
criticizing "socio-economic" models of causation. n24 Instead, two prominent but quite different
trends have emerged: a stress on the linguistic construction of terms and a focus on the independent
significance of state structure. n25
While modern scholarship has provided exciting new approaches and strong critiques of
simplistic and overly-deterministic models, it has been less successful at replacing them with
convincing alternative theories of how law develops. Some critical scholars, true to the most
extreme implications of the post-modern critique of structure and narrative, disavow the very idea
of causal explanations. n26 Most legal historians prefer the formulation that law is "relatively
autonomous" from broader societal forces. But not only is the degree of autonomy at issue, the
variety of forces which scholars argue affects law is wider than ever. This in turn raises questions of
methodology. n27 Disputes continue between internalists, who point to doctrinal, intellectual causes
in explaining legal changes, and externalists, who stress political or cultural reasons. n28
So, formulations regarding causation remain problematic. Morton Horwitz's first volume on
legal history suggests that "law is autonomous to the extent that ideas are autonomous." n29
Christopher Tomlins questions any neat distinction between  [*989]  "law" and "society," n30 but
also calls for a "greater analytic appreciation of the law's autonomy." n31 Tomlins and Andrew
King characterize "legal forms" as "concepts" which have "multiple avenues of realization but in
practice [are] conventionally realized in official discourse in ways that most accord with, or least
depart from, prevailing structures of power." n32 Daniel Ernst allows that "the historical
contingency of common-sense notions of causation has been demonstrated." n33 Robert Gordon
agrees that legal rules are "contingent products of time and circumstances: contested in their
content, multiple in their forms, variable across time, place, and social group in the ways they are
put to practical use." n34
These observations are all true, but scholars should try to go as far as they can to identify
specific structures, causes and effects, and to explain why certain contingent results actually
occurred. This history of public sector labor law cries out for a melding of old and new techniques,
and studying this field casts a rewarding new light on recent and older approaches.
II
COURTS AND PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS: BIAS, STATE STRUCTURE, AND FALSE
CONSTRUCTIONS
Courts settled public sector labor law for a remarkably long time. Since state statutes did not
even begin to supplant judicial rules until at least the 1960s, courts controlled labor relations in
government employment for nearly thirty years after the NLRA set federal statutory rules for
private employment. This means, first, that a study of public sector law must interpret and explain
judicial opinions. It also means that these cases provide a rich source of materials for studying
judicial decision-making. In analyzing these cases, it is instructive to compare private sector law.
Prior to the 1930s, judges restricted the actions of private sector unions through common law
conspiracy and tort doctrines, antitrust statutes, and the constitutional "right to contract." Still,
[*990]  private sector unions had managed to carve out spheres of operation in which they could
organize, bargain, and strike well before the 1930s. n35 In the public sector, however, before the
1930s and through at least the late 1950s, judges across the nation were unwilling to permit
government employees any rights to bargain or to strike, and courts routinely upheld bars on their
organizing. Causation in public sector labor law is thus an especially intriguing question, because
the law was so remarkably consistent over time and geographic area, and because it cannot be
explained simply by reference to the factors driving private sector law. In the public sector, three
themes recur and blend: hostility toward unions, concerns about state structure, and judicial
misconstructions of the concept of a "union."
A. Bias Against Labor: Realism and its Revisions as A Partial Explanation
1. Bias as a Factor: Union Members as Disloyal and Inefficient
The claim by legal realists that judges in the progressive era were simply biased against unions
has long been an influential critique of both the development of labor law specifically and of how
and why judges make decisions generally. From the many decisions invalidating wage and hour
statutes and bans on "yellow dog" contracts, to the thousands of injunctions issued against unions
for strikes or boycotts, it seemed impossible to understand court behavior in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries without assuming that judges were imposing their own political bias in
favor of employers, instead of using dispassionate and objective legal analysis. n36 Labor historians
have generally at least implicitly accepted this view. n37 Modern legal scholars in the realist
tradition explain these decisions as representing a "lag" period in which the law failed to deal with
the realities of large scale capitalism and its effects, or a period in which corporate  [*991]  interests
temporarily captured the legal system. n38
In public sector labor cases, judges were quick to apply anti-union doctrines and rhetoric taken
from private sector decisions. The constitutional "freedom of contract" that Coppage v. Kansas n39
and other cases used to strike down statutes outlawing yellow dog contracts (barring employees
from joining or retaining membership in labor unions) was imported into public sector cases simply
as a matter of policy. The actual holdings of the private sector rulings were not precedent on point,
because no statutory bans on yellow dog contracts in the public sector existed. Nevertheless, in
1915, Frederick v. Owens n40 cited Coppage and related precedent to uphold a ban on Cleveland
public school teachers joining the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). "We heartily concur in
these decisions," Frederick emphasized. Freedom of contract "should surely apply with equal force
to public officials." n41 In 1920, McNatt v. Lawther n42 upheld a ban on Dallas firefighters joining
the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), quoting Coppage: "If freedom of contract is to
be preserved, the employer must be left at liberty to decide for himself whether such membership ...
is consistent with the satisfactory performance of the duties of employment." n43 Indeed, "any
restrictions upon the freedom of the employer in such matter ... would probably be held
unconstitutional." n44 Courts cited private sector yellow dog cases until the Norris-LaGuardia Act
of 1932 n45 invalidated them. n46 Well after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, however, courts continued
[*992]  to uphold yellow dog contracts in the public sector. n47
Frequently, courts equated union membership with disloyalty and inefficiency. In 1920, San
Antonio Firefighters' Local Union No. 84 v. Bell upheld the power of local authorities to fire
members of the IAFF, noting that the union had not specifically pled that union membership would
not affect firefighters' loyalty or subject them to orders that would interfere with public service. n48
In 1917, People ex rel. Fursman v. City of Chicago sustained a rule in which the Chicago Board of
Education declared it would not hire members of the AFT, because "membership by teachers in
labor unions ... is inimical to proper discipline, prejudicial to the efficiency of the teaching force and
detrimental to the welfare of the public...." n49 In 1923, Hutchinson v. Magee, approving a ban on
the IAFF, quoted the assertion of the Pittsburgh Director of Public Safety that union membership
was "in the very nature of things, inconsistent with ... discipline, ... subversive of the public service
and detrimental to the general welfare." n50
One judge even took the unusual step of noting that public sector labor cases had incorporated
negative views judges held of unions. In CIO v. City of Dallas, the Texas Supreme Court upheld a
yellow dog rule for city employees, citing cases from eight states in support of the decision. n51 On
rehearing, Chief Justice Bond concurred but added that he did not join the court's "approval of the
authorities from other jurisdictions, evidencing judicial prejudice against the Unions generally." n52
Whether "freedom of contract" and related ideas that courts used in labor and employment cases
reflected an explicitly conscious animosity toward labor can be debated, as can the significance of
the judges' conscious understanding of their own motivations. Robert Gordon summarizes recent
works that revise  [*993]  the realist interpretation, suggesting that judges in this era married
Jacksonian, Free Soil, and anti-slavery ideology. In judicial minds, this combination led to the belief
that some types of economic pressures (e.g. labor boycotts) were intolerable and others, such as
employers' power to fire at-will, were "simply natural facts about the world." n53 Whatever the
motivation, up to the mid-1930s courts frequently struck down laws that provided rights to workers
in the private sector and held many actions by unions to be illegal. n54 Judges who decided public
sector labor cases were part of this era and thus part of a mindset that generally did not look kindly
on organized labor. n55
2. Not Bias Alone: Outside Government "Their Merits are Fully Conceded"
Crucially, however, well beyond the "Lochner era" and even  [*994]  the New Deal, public
sector decisions often took their tone and text from early private sector cases that portrayed unions
in an unflattering light. The opinion in CIO v. City of Dallas was one of several to quote at length
the extremely hostile view of Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy: "To tolerate or recognize any
combination of Civil Service employees of the government as a labor organization or union is not
only incompatible with the spirit of democracy, but inconsistent with every principle upon which
our Government is founded." n56 Murphy was decided in 1943 and CIO v. City of Dallas in 1946,
by which time private sector unions had won a considerable amount of acceptance and
respectability. The years immediately after World War II saw some increased concerns over union
power. But not even the rhetoric from the Republican Congress that passed the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947 n57 matched the consistent judicial denunciations of public sector unions. Therefore, whatever
prompted judicial skepticism about private sector unions in the Progressive Era or thereafter cannot
by itself explain the extent to which courts continued to be horrified by public sector unions after
World War II.
Indeed, well before and well after the New Deal, courts imposed greater restrictions on unions
in the public sector than those in the private. Before the 1930s, courts had tolerated bargaining and
even some forms of strikes. n58 After the NLRA was passed, judges generally made their peace
with private sector unions and acknowledged the legitimacy of private sector labor and employment
law. n59 In the public sector, without statutory guidance,  [*995]  judges had the discretion to rely
on common law rules, state laws on related topics, constitutional doctrines, and their own
predilections. From these sources, well after the NLRA, judges forged public sector rules that were
much less generous than private sector law had been before the NLRA. Explanations for this must
look beyond the attitudes of the judiciary toward unions in the private sector before the New Deal.
Courts sometimes explicitly distinguished public and private sector labor. In 1946, City of
Jackson v. McLeod n60 upheld a bar on police affiliating with a union that was part of the
American Federation of Labor (AFL). The opinion averred that the case did "not involve in any way
the merits or demerits of labor unions when confined to private employment. In their place, outside
of governmental agencies, their merits are fully conceded." n61 CIO v. City of Dallas stressed that
it "should be understood at the beginning that the status of governmental employees, National, State
and Municipal, is radically different from that of employees in private business or industry." n62
Murphy concluded that "we all recognize the value and the necessity of collective bargaining in
industrial and social life, nonetheless, such bargaining is impossible between the Government and
its employees, by reason of the very nature of Government itself." n63 What was it about the nature
of government that made public sector unions so different?
B. "The Very Nature of Government Itself": The Obstacles of State Structure
Judges made this distinction partly out of concern for the division of state powers, which they
couched in terms of the doctrines of deference and delegation. While judges would enforce rules
which obligated unwilling private employers to deal with unions, they repeatedly insisted that it was
not the role of courts to interfere in the labor relations of other branches of government. First, courts
held that legislatures had delegated power over employment matters to subordinate public bodies
and officials. Judges, therefore, should defer to their decisions regarding  [*996]  unions. Second,
courts held that public employers could not delegate any power to a private body such as a union.
Specifically, delegating to labor the power to bargain or to arbitrators the power to bind
governments would violate non-delegation doctrines and, ostensibly, threaten democracy. Judges,
therefore, promoted a state structure in which they uniformly deferred to the restrictive rules of
public officials, the direct employers of labor, because such power had been delegated to such
officials. At the same time, judges refused to allow bargaining or arbitration, on the grounds that
this would constitute an improper delegation of power from such officials.
Recognizing such concerns fits well with the recent "new institutionalist" scholarship which is
"bringing the state back in" to explanations of causation. n64 State structure and capacity affect, and
are not merely affected by, society and groups within it. n65 This model has been applied to the
development of private sector law. Surprisingly, though, works that stress the role of the state in
labor matters generally ignore the state as an employer of labor. n66 Some studies have shown that
the very structure of American federalism, with its myriad layers and exceptionally strong  [*997]
courts, fundamentally affected labor in the private sector. n67 But, although a very few scholars
have at least noted that this void should be filled, none have described how state structure played
out with an even greater vengeance in the public sector. n68
1. Judicial Deference
The issue of deference to subordinate state bodies was increasingly important in the early
decades of the twentieth century as the role of administrative agencies increased. Before the 1870s,
such agencies were relatively unimportant in state government. From the 1880s to the early 1900s,
states began forming agencies with at least investigatory powers, such as boards of public health,
industrial commissions, and railroad commissions. By the early twentieth century, for example,
thirty-two states had bureaus of labor statistics. Such trends continued at both the state and national
level. By 1941 the federal government had fifty-one major administrative agencies. Courts had been
wrestling with the proper extent of the authority of such agencies since the nineteenth century,
famously refusing to enforce regulations imposed on railroads, and a burst of economic regulation
by administrative agencies beginning around 1910 prompted another round of controversy on this
issue. The power and independence of such agencies nonetheless continued to grow. A
comprehensive law setting out the relations between courts, the public, and administrative agencies,
the Administrative Procedure Act, would not be passed until 1946. In the meantime, courts had to
decide such points for themselves. n69
 [*998]  In public sector labor relations, courts always took a very deferential stand. In 1917, the
Fursman court noted that the Chicago board of education's ban on teachers joining the AFT was an
issue of first impression but opined that it "presents no great difficulties." By statute, the board had
the power to employ teachers, so the court would defer to the board in all hiring decisions. It was
immaterial whether the reason for the refusal to employ ... is because the applicant is
married or unmarried, is of fair complexion or dark, is or is not a member of a trades
union, or whether no reason is given for such refusal. The board is not bound to give
any reason for its action. n70
In the 1920 San Antonio Firefighters case, n71 a Texas court denied an injunction the union
sought after city commissioners threatened to fire IAFF members. The court held that the
commissioners had discretion in removing employees and that it would presume that such actions
were lawful absent a showing of bad faith or fraud. The court acknowledged that the mayor had
made a campaign promise not to retaliate against the union, but still found no bad faith. A city had
the right to determine that union membership rendered its appointees inefficient or untrustworthy.
Courts had very limited power in reviewing removals, and here the commissioners had the authority
to decide that the "rules of the AFL" were inimical to the interests of the city. n72
Courts throughout the country employed this rationale for decades. In 1915, in Frederick v.
Owens, an Ohio court held that a school board had sufficient discretion to impose a yellow dog rule
and did not have to give reasons "that are satisfactory to the courts." n73 In 1935, in Carter v.
Thompson, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a ban that applied to the IAFF but not to a union that
was not affiliated with the AFL. Although an applicable civil service statute required "cause" for
discharge, the court held that the city manager could classify union membership as sufficient cause
for removal. "He must, of necessity, be vested with a  [*999]  large measure of discretion ...." n74
Courts also deferred to civil service agencies in cases denying rights to unions. In 1946, City of
Jackson v. McLeod n75 overturned a unanimous jury verdict that had found the Mississippi city
liable for discharging policemen who had joined the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME). The local civil service commission had upheld the removals on
grounds of insubordination and "acts tending to injure the public service." n76 The state supreme
court ruled that its review was limited to whether the commission's actions were taken in good faith
and for cause. If so, courts would have to defer. n77 It was "not competent ... for the Circuit Court
and its jury to convert themselves into an administrative body and to become a civil service
commission ...." n78
The deference concern could also be cast as anxiety about the judiciary's capacity to handle
these matters: judges worried about being overwhelmed by appeals from the decisions of
government employers if they acted as a review board for dismissals from public service. In 1939,
Levine v. Farely n79 upheld the discharge of a postal worker who had written newspaper articles
protesting discrimination against other union members. The Postal Service fired him for bringing
the Service into disrepute. n80 Despite the guarantee of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act that federal
workers would not be discharged for union activities, the court refused to hear the merits:
"Interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments
of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief." n81
Crucially, such judicial abnegation of any role in restraining anti-union acts by public employers
under the rubric of deference doomed union rights because it took place in the context of the
divided and diffuse structure of governments within individual states. In effect, courts gave local
government bodies, the actual employers of labor, complete discretion to deny unions of  [*1000]
their employees any rights. School boards issued yellow dog rules barring membership in the AFT;
n82 fire chiefs, police boards, mayors, and heads of municipal departments created rules governing
their own workers to which courts would then invariably defer. It is hardly surprising that these
employers wrote restrictive rules. n83 It is arguably surprising that courts saw no potential conflict
of interest in their authors.
2. Non-Delegation: Government Power in Private Hands
Judges used a second concern about state structure to limit the rights of public sector unions.
Courts consistently held that collective bargaining, arbitration, and related activities by public sector
unions constituted impermissible delegations of governmental power to private parties. While the
famous "nondelegation" cases of the New Deal may be remembered for invalidating attempts to
shift power from one government body to another, they also found improper attempts to shift
government power to private parties. For example, in 1935, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States n84 invalidated provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act partly because of
an impermissible delegation of power from Congress to the president. But further, and more
relevant here, Schechter also held that empowering representatives of business, labor, and the public
to establish codes of fair dealing for various industries was an improper delegation of legislative
functions to private parties. n85 Public sector cases typically relied on this latter branch of the
nondelegation doctrine. n86  [*1001]  Notably, although this doctrine was largely abandoned by the
U.S. Supreme Court and federal courts after Schechter, it recently seems to be making a comeback.
n87 In state courts, especially in public sector labor cases, it never went away. n88
Indeed, judges routinely applied this doctrine to public sector labor well after federal courts had
apparently abandoned it and well after the NLRA authorized bargaining and arbitration in the
private sector. In 1945, Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore n89 held that a
municipality could not bargain collectively or even agree to a dues check-off provision, because
"city authorities cannot delegate ... their continuing discretion" over labor relations. n90 In 1946,
Nutter v. City of Santa Monica n91 overturned a lower court ruling that permitted collective
bargaining with city workers, explaining that the authority of public officials "may not be delegated
or surrendered to others, since it is public property." n92 Dicta in the 1949 case of City of Cleveland
v. Division  [*1002]  268 n93 hinted that completely voluntary participation by a city in labor
arbitration might not be an illegal delegation of authority. But the opinion stressed that employers
had no legal obligation "to set up this kind of machinery. There is nothing in the law that says that
employees may force ... [a] public employer ... to enter into any labor contract." n94
No court ever faced the potential contradiction of whether to defer to a city that had decided to
"delegate" authority by bargaining. As Nutter observed, it was not "an accepted practice for public
bodies to enter into contracts with the employees of publicly owned operations...." n95 A report in
1941 concluded that no city had ever signed a collective bargaining agreement similar to those in
private industry, and that "legal opinions ... are unanimous" that cities did not have the power to do
so. A follow-up study in 1947 explained that the majority view was still that labor contracts with
cities were "void as a delegation of public power to a private group," although a minority held that
an agreement might be legal in certain cases. n96 In fact, a number of cities and municipal
departments engaged in informal, limited forms of bargaining, or at least discussions, with their
unionized employees. n97 Of course, judges were not likely to hear such cases. When cities chose
to negotiate with their employees, no logical plaintiff to challenge the practice existed. n98
Still, some courts strongly implied that they would not defer even if local governments
voluntarily attempted to share power with unions. Here, judges invoked the most fundamental value
of state structure: democracy itself. City of Springfield v. Clouse, n99 decided in 1947, refused to
permit city workers engaged in street cleaning and sewage disposal to bargain. "Under our form of
government, public office or employment ... cannot  [*1003]  become a matter of bargaining and
contract." This was true because wages and working conditions involved "the exercise of legislative
powers." n100 Local officials could not bargain such power away.
This reasoning made the fundamental mistake of conflating bargaining over wages, which often
were set by statute, with bargaining over a host of other terms of employment, which were not. For
example, Clouse wrongly asserted that "working conditions of public officers and employees are
wholly matters of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or contract." n101 Incorrectly
assuming that the text of legislation was dispositive of all or even most aspects of labor relations,
the court insisted that laws "must be made by deliberation of the lawmakers and not by bargaining
with anyone outside the lawmaking body." n102 Using the same flawed approach, Murphy asserted
that collective bargaining "has no place in government service" because working conditions were
guided by laws that could not be abrogated by agreement. n103 Yet as AFL general counsel Joseph
Padway argued, while wages in government service could be covered by statute and therefore not
be subject to negotiation, a union should still lawfully be allowed to bargain over other aspects of
employment. n104
Using this defective premise, Murphy made the "democracy" point most dramatically.
Permitting unions in public employment would "sanction control of governmental functions not by
laws but by men. Such policy if followed to its logical conclusion would inevitably lead to chaos,
dictators, and annihilation of representative government." n105 CIO v. City of Dallas quoted this
passage whole. n106 Murphy added that "nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit
that hired servants of the state can dictate to the Government the hours, the wages and  [*1004]
conditions under which they will carry on essential services vital to the welfare, safety and security
of the citizen." n107
3. Not State Structure Alone: Neutral Rules?
a. The Rules in Other Contexts
In applying nondelegation and deference rules, judges were, to some extent, simply using
"neutral" rules that had arisen partly outside the labor context. As with bias toward unions, however,
use of neutral rules alone is not a sufficient causal explanation for public sector labor cases. Murray
Nesbitt insists that public sector labor law was "singled out for special application" of the
nondelegation rules and that contemporary doctrines could have allowed public employers to
negotiate. n108 Courts were not necessarily demonstrably wrong in applying nondelegation rules,
but the law in these areas was sufficiently unsettled that courts easily could have justified different
results. Thus, courts were, in part, actively promoting specific types of power relations amongst
state actors.
Judicial use of delegation and deference doctrines outside the labor context in this era were
highly inconsistent, making it difficult to evaluate how "neutral" judges were in labor cases. State
court opinions on the subject were so conflicting that Kenneth C. Davis, in a leading treatise on
administrative law, concluded dryly that "identifiable principles do not emerge." n109 One review
of the literature concluded that "neither federal nor state courts have developed consistent principles
for use in deciding when delegations to private parties are valid." n110 Judges also varied widely in
the amount of deference they gave to the decisions of administrative agencies. Rulings by state
judges on the proper standard were "exceedingly diverse." n111 Yet courts consistently held against
public sector unions.
How did labor cases fit into the underlying purposes of the doctrine prohibiting delegation to
private parties? A central rationale for this doctrine was to avoid an end-run around democratic
procedures by vesting legislative power "in a body  [*1005]  dominated by self-interested groups."
n112 Giving private parties legislative powers violates the basic principle that accountable public
officials make the law. It also puts regulatory power in the hands of private parties who could
regulate themselves or others in a manner that provides the private parties with maximum benefits,
without consideration of broader effects. n113 Thus, for example, a state court struck down an
attempt by the New York legislature to delegate to a private club the power to exercise licensing
functions. n114 A court also found an improper delegation when the California legislature
empowered a seven-member board to set minimum prices for dry-cleaning, where six of the
members represented private industry. n115
One could easily distinguish such grants of complete discretion to private bodies from collective
bargaining in the public sector, which involves compromises between the employer and the union,
or from arbitration, which involves enforcing provisions in a collective agreement to which the
government employer had already agreed. Judges could have concluded, as they hold today, that
arbitrators merely execute the law but do not actually make it. n116 In bargaining, as AFL counsel
Padway observed, government officials retain significant discretion. n117 Lee Pressman, general
counsel to the CIO, also observed at the time that bargaining involved matters "mutually
determined." n118 In the first half of the century, courts rejected such arguments.
Of course, courts did allow governments to enter into contracts with some private entities,
notably with businesses for goods and services. When the government "comes down from its
position of sovereignty and enters the domain of commerce," the Supreme Court held in 1875, "it
submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there." n119 It had long been established that
states and cities could form contracts on which private parties could rely. n120 Public officials had
to have authorization - ultimately  [*1006]  from a statute - to thus bind the government. But
although broadly worded laws authorizing states to enter into a variety of contracts were common
by the 1920s and 1930s, n121 labor cases inconsistently found that statutes gave local officials
essentially complete discretion over relations with unions but did not give them authority to contract
with them. In 1942, Pressman, general counsel for the CIO, argued in vain that municipalities had
the implied power to enter into labor contracts just as they did other contracts. n122 Again, such
pleas went unanswered.
b. The Enduring Impotence of Holmes's Constitution
 Further suggesting that more than a neutral application of institutional rules motivated courts in
public sector labor cases, unions of government workers failed in their attempts to rely on two
aspects of the American state that potentially could have favored them: constitutional rights and the
"proprietary function" doctrine. Until the late 1960s, judges repeatedly rejected claims that
constitutional rights to association, speech, due process, or equal protection trumped bans on labor
affiliation in public employment. In so doing, they often cited Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's
maxim in McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, holding that a police officer could be fired for making
statements that were within the ambit of free speech. "The petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics," Holmes declared, "but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." n123 Thus,
in 1946, the union in CIO v. City of Dallas argued that the ban on affiliation violated the employees'
First Amendment rights of assembly, speech, press, and petition. The court approvingly quoted
Holmes's 1892 decision in reply, adding that "these rights ... are purely personal and may be waived
... by voluntarily accepting employment with the City of Dallas.... While they have the right to these
constitutional privileges and freedoms, they have no constitutional right to remain in the service of
the City." n124 Courts relied on McAuliffe through the early 1960s. n125
 [*1007]  Since the late 1960s, courts have found not only that public employment constitutes
state action sufficient to trigger the Bill of Rights, including the right to association, but also that
public employment cannot be conditioned on a full waiver of such rights. n126 This in turn meant
that public employment could not be predicated on a promise not to join a union. Thus, in 1969, a
court found that a North Carolina law that barred public workers from joining unions violated the
First Amendment right of free association. n127 Although unionists often urged this exact argument
in the first half of the century, judges invariably dismissed such ideas. n128
c. Unworkable Public/Private Distinctions
Nor were unions very successful in urging a distinction between the "proprietary" role of
government, in which it acted more as a business, and its "traditional" role, where its right to avoid
dealing with unions was supreme. Some statutes did give more rights to labor in, for example,
publicly owned utilities. n129 As a matter of common law, the proprietary/traditional dichotomy
survived in vague forms until 1985, when the Supreme Court denounced it as "unsound in principle
and unworkable in  [*1008]  practice." n130 But judges often treated this distinction skeptically,
and it rarely benefitted unions. For example, in 1946, Nutter repudiated it as judicial legislation
without legislative foundation. n131
Courts also typically resolved the question of what constituted a "government function" against
allowing rights for labor. Most famously, in United States v. United Mine Workers, n132 decided in
1947, the Supreme Court sustained an action against the United Mine Workers for violating an
injunction against striking. The union relied on the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which banned most labor
injunctions in the private sector. The Court held that since the mines had been seized by the federal
government, the miners were federal employees, and therefore Norris-LaGuardia did not apply.
n133 At the same time, judges would analogize private sector workers in positions involving
"public safety" to government employees. For example, in 1946, Beth-El Hospital v. Robbins n134
enjoined hospital workers from striking, despite a state anti-injunction law. Citing public safety, the
court added that the workers "are discharging public functions, at least to the extent that they are
performing functions which, in the absence of these agencies, would of necessity be assumed by the
state." n135 In sum, no variation of the "private/public" dichotomy involving state actions ever
seemed to work in the favor of unions.
C. False Constructions of What a Union Was and Could Be
Public sector labor cases can be explained only by adding a third factor to the considerations of
bias and state structure: judges falsely constructed the term "union." The "linguistic turn,"
originating in the writings of French theorists such as Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida, asserts
that language is central in constructing reality. This approach has been influential in recent studies
of labor and labor law. n136 A moderate version  [*1009]  of this approach reveals that judges in
public sector labor cases misconstrued the concept of "union" to exclude organizations of workers
performing waged labor for the government. Critical scholars would note that courts rejected a
competing construction of these terms offered by labor in word and deed: even though public sector
unions had all formally renounced strikes and most were willing to forego traditional collective
bargaining, at least over wages, n137 courts insisted on seeing unions as institutions that inevitably
bargained and struck. Especially in the aftermath of the infamous Boston police strike of 1919,
judges could not imagine giving public workers such rights. n138 Nor could judges believe that
statutes that granted rights to "labor organizations" or "unions" could possibly cover public sector
unions, even in the face of legislative history that suggested they should. Judicial construction, in
turn, had a dispositive effect on the outcome of cases and, therefore, ultimately on the reality of
public sector labor relations. Critical scholars would also stress that modern scholars must reach
beyond the cramped notions of contemporary judges. n139
1. Judges Reject Competing Constructions (and Realities)
In forming their construction of unions, judges seemed, at best, blind to relevant events outside
their courtrooms. First, public  [*1010]  sector unions in this era, while not as large or prominent as
in recent decades, did exist in significant numbers: union density in the public sector began to hold
steady at around 10-13% by the late thirties. In 1934, public sector unions represented 9% of the
nearly 3,300,000 government workers in the U.S., who in turn constituted 12.7% of all non-
agricultural workers in the country. n140 Second, these unions took actions on behalf of their
members, from representing employees in civil service proceedings, to lobbying government
officials for better laws or working conditions, to electing more sympathetic employers, to
providing information to their members and the public. n141 Third, these unions almost never
struck. After the Boston police strike of 1919, AFL and later CIO public sector unions renounced
the strike weapon, and in fact strikes by public sector unions from 1919 to 1945 were rare, small in
scale, and short. But in the courtroom, unionists lacked the power to make this image of unionism
real. n142
Instead, judges clung exclusively to the private sector image of unions, ignoring the ongoing
presence of active public sector unions that did not formally bargain or strike and rejecting the
sworn statements and binding documents that unions proffered as evidence of their different nature.
In 1947, King v. Priest n143 upheld a rule banning an AFSCME local that more than eight hundred
police officers had joined. The union's charter barred striking and bargaining and stated that the oath
that police officers took regarding their duties came before any obligation to the union. Instead of
tactics used in the private sector, the charter continued, the local would, "by publicity, direct public
attention to conditions that need correcting, ... seek legislative action, ... represent individuals in
administrative procedure, and prevent discriminatory and arbitrary practices." n144
The Missouri Supreme Court would have none of it: "The court, of course, knows what a labor
union is ...." n145 Defining the institution, the court took judicial notice of the "common
knowledge" that "some of the most common methods used by labor unions ... are strikes, threats to
strike, [and] collective bargaining  [*1011]  agreements ...." n146 Refusing to accept an alternate
model of "union," but without claiming that any AFSCME local had ever attempted to strike or
bargain, the court asserted that "all of the rights and powers ordinarily inherent in a labor union
would exist actually or potentially" in the local, "regardless of the form of its charter and the present
admissions of appellants." n147
Similarly, CIO v. City of Dallas discounted the fact that the union had renounced formal
collective bargaining and that its constitution and bylaws barred strikes "or other concerted
economic weapons or procedures." n148 The court ruled that the "declaration of the local to
abandon the usual procedure pursued by labor unions to accomplish their purposes, is in
irreconcilable conflict with the declared purposes and objects of the unions." n149 The decision
cited documents from the national CIO, not the public sector local involved, that stated that the CIO
was organized to help locals bargain collectively and that such activities "constitute the only
effective means possessed by organized labor to accomplish economic security ...." n150 The court
also quoted President Franklin Roosevelt's statement that collective bargaining "cannot be
transplanted into the public service" because of the "very nature and purpose of government" and
that strikes in public service could never be allowed. n151
Even when labor specifically proposed a different, limited, and entirely plausible meaning for
"bargaining" in the public sector, judges rejected it, maintaining that the private sector practice
defined the term. Clouse rebuffed a union's argument that it could engage in some bargaining with a
city. The union relied on section 29 of the Missouri Constitution, which provided that "employees
shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing." n152  [*1012]  R. T. Wood, the president of the Missouri Federation of Labor and the
man who had originally proposed section 29, presented the court with a model of bargaining in the
public sector that seemingly avoided the problems that judges had expressed. Wood stipulated that
government workers could not bargain over wages and hours, because such matters were controlled
by city officials and by statute. n153 Nonetheless, he contended that collective bargaining was
applicable to other matters: "classifications, working conditions of all kinds, night work, day work,
and a multiplicity of items aside from wages and hours ...." n154 Wood urged that "collective
bargaining means a good many things"; there were "many types of collective bargaining." n155
When a "representative of the employees of the city sits down at a table and discusses ... relations
between an employee and the city, that is collective bargaining." n156
The court, however, refused to consider any alternative to the private sector model. "This is
confusing collective bargaining with the rights of petition, peaceable assembly and free speech."
Section 29 was "intended to safeguard collective bargaining as that term was usually understood in
employer and employee relations in private industry." n157 Thus, the court pronounced a tautology
that would continue to haunt public sector workers: since only workers in private industry had
established collective bargaining rights, laws establishing collective bargaining rights could only
apply to the private sector. n158 James Westbrook correctly labels the reasoning of the Clouse court
the "All-or-Nothing Misunderstanding," and concludes that "Mr. Wood had a better grasp of the
issues than did the Missouri Supreme Court." n159
One lone dissent credited the claims of public sector unions that they would behave differently
than private sector unions. In City of Jackson v. McLeod, n160 Justice McGehee of the Mississippi
Supreme Court would have held that membership in AFSCME was not sufficient cause to discharge
police officers under a civil service law. Among other things, the "jury was entitled to find  [*1013]
... that there is a fundamental difference between [AFSCME] and the labor unions in general."
McGehee noted that the union's charter denied policemen the right to strike and that no AFSCME
local had ever struck a police department. Further, the union did not advocate negotiating contracts
by collective bargaining or the closed shop. n161 McGehee even quoted a statement from former
AFL president Samuel Gompers, issued in 1919 in response to the Boston turmoil, that it was the
position of the AFL that police would neither strike nor assume any obligation that conflicted with
their duty. n162 Yet beyond this single voice, which itself did not come until 1946, judges
uniformly refused to accept that an organization of workers could be a "union" without striking or
bargaining. In taking this stance, judges not only rejected what unions said they would do, but
critically they ignored what public sector unions were actually doing.
2. Statutes Apply Only to Real Unions and Workers
Judicial reliance on the private sector model hurt public sector unions in two distinct ways. First,
as shown above, courts refused to believe that organizations of public workers would behave
differently than private sector workers. Second, courts held that public employees were not covered
by state labor relations acts, even if the law did not explicitly exclude them, because those acts
mentioned "bargaining," "striking," or even "business" somewhere in its text. Courts reasoned that
such acts were therefore meant only to cover "real" unions that undertook those activities, and
therefore no part of the act could apply to public workers. The specific holding of Murphy was that
the National Association of Railway Postal Clerks (NARPC), at that time a racially exclusive
organization, was not a "labor organization" under a New York civil rights statute. The NARPC was
not a "labor organization" because part of this civil rights law listed "collective bargaining" as a task
of "labor organizations." So, despite having held an AFL charter since 1917, despite being
composed of members who were engaged in a common occupation for a common employer, and
despite the fact that it did represent its members in employment-related matters, the NARPC was
not a "labor organization." n163
 [*1014]  Similar logic abounded in decisions that held that laws applying to "unions" or "labor
organizations" or even to "employees" did not cover public sector unions. Frequently, these state
laws did not, as the NLRA did, explicitly exclude the public sector in coverage provisions or
elsewhere. In 1946, Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami n164 held that a statute
granting rights for "employees" to organize could only apply to the private sector. The statute in
other places discussed strikes and picketing, and such references "are strange and incongruous terms
when attempted to be squared with the governmental process as we know it." n165 CIO v. City of
Dallas refused to find that an ordinance forbidding city workers from joining a union violated a
state law generally protecting the right to join unions. n166 The legislature could not have had
public employees in mind, the court reasoned, because the preamble to the statute referred to
"unions affecting ... practically every business and industrial enterprise." n167
Even when legislative history appeared to support the union's position, judges reached the same
result. King v. Priest held that a state constitutional provision guaranteeing "that employees shall
have the right to organize" did not apply to the public sector, even though language limiting the
clause to private employment was debated and dropped in drafting the provision. n168 The court
reached this conclusion, in part, because the constitution also included a right to bargain, which, the
court held, could not apply to public workers. n169
Courts also constructed "union" to mean an institution that provided countervailing pressure to
business. In the public sector, without capitalism and its potential abuses, unions apparently were
unnecessary. Nutter, holding that a state labor statute was not meant to cover government workers,
made this point most explicitly. The "legislature recognized that there has been, and is, oppression
of labor in the field of private industry,  [*1015]  where there has not been freedom of contract."
n170 The incentive of personal gain could drive private employers to seek profits at the expense of
their employees. So, private sector workers should be allowed to organize to protect themselves.
But no evidence existed that this "incentive and its attendant evils are found in public employment."
n171 The legislature had "not discerned in public employment the existence of the conflicts
between labor and capital that exist in private industry ... 'altogether different conditions prevail.'"
n172 Government officials did "not have the same incentive to oppress the worker ...." n173 Public
employers echoed this type of objection in their legal arguments. In Miami Waterworks Local 654,
the city's brief insisted that its officials were not "motivated only by the profit motive ... the same
compelling necessity for private employees to organize does not exist as to public employees." n174
Such quasi-Marxist analysis might seem surprising from a state appellate court and municipal
attorneys. More broadly, public sector unions did not seem to have a place in the contemporary
paradigm that justified the NLRA, "industrial pluralism." Industrial pluralism, among other things,
granted that private sector workers and their employers had some opposing interests regarding
wages, hours, and working conditions. Pluralists proposed that these interests be resolved as much
as possible through private acts of self-governance: equalizing bargaining power through
unionization, then collective bargaining and private contractual enforcement. n175 It is certainly
understandable that the Great Depression and its attendant labor strife would put the practical and
theoretical focus on the effects of unrestrained capitalism on labor in the private sector. Still, this
approach ignored the fact that large numbers of government workers themselves had long felt
sufficiently oppressed to form unions-not just to contest wages, but also over working conditions,
dignity, and  [*1016]  some measure of control over the workplace. n176 These unions also had a
long tradition of attempting to represent their members and going to court as a result of such
attempts. Judges again were unwilling to look at the realities outside their courtrooms.
3. The Misleading Memory of the Boston Police Strike
Even had judges thought that public employees needed unions to address workplace problems,
the judicial construction of "union" solely along private sector lines meant that judges assumed that
public sector unions would act to address these problems in exactly the same ways as private sector
unions. This was especially frightening given the legacy of the Boston police strike of 1919. Thus,
the consequences of this construction were harsh. In 1920, the court in McNatt v. Lawther, n177
upholding a ban on firefighters in Dallas joining the IAFF, referred to the "dire consequences" of
the Boston strike. The court suggested that the ban may have been designed "to minimize ... the
probability of some such calamity in the city of Dallas." n178 Such fears were rekindled after less
dramatic public sector strikes in 1946. Again, however, these beliefs existed despite the fact that
between 1919 and 1946, there were very few public sector strikes and none of any significance.
n179
Still, judges expressed their concerns rather theatrically. The Murphy decision, in a case that did
not in any way present a factual or legal issue involving strikes, proclaimed that to "admit as true
that Government employees have power to halt or check the functions of Government unless their
demands are satisfied, is to transfer to them all legislative, executive and judicial power. Nothing
would be more ridiculous." n180 Strikes against the government were always unjustified and
represented "rebellion  [*1017]  against constituted authority." n181 The court quoted Roosevelt:
"[A] strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or
obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward
the paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable."
n182 City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Trades Council, decided in 1949, also
insisted that strikes by government workers would be "rebellion against constituted authority." n183
City of Cleveland v. Division 268 similarly labeled such actions "rebellion against government."
n184 The judge in that case continued: "The right to strike, if accorded to public employees, I say,
is one means of destroying government. And if they destroy government, we have anarchy, we have
chaos." n185 He added that a ban on such strikes was "merely expressive of the common law." n186
This was true: a study in 1953 concluded that "in every case that has been reported, the right of
public employees to strike is emphatically denied." n187 But such reasoning by courts
fundamentally misunderstood the actual nature of public sector unions; such unions, in fact, did not
engage in any significant strikes between 1919 and 1946.
Nonetheless, the false constructions of terms such as "union" created a very different reality in
the courtroom, which in turn affected the world of public sector unions outside the courts. Public
sector workers continued to contest this construction, acting on their beliefs that they were real
unionists. They created labor organizations and represented their members, even in a vacuum of
legal rights. In modern times, some of their alternate understandings of what their rights were or
should be have prevailed in the courts and legislatures. Still, the power of judicial construction was
often crippling.
D. Synthesizing the Strands into a Coherent Theme
 The factors listed above - bias against labor, concerns for state structure, and false constructions
of "union" - did not exist in  [*1018]  isolation from each other. Decisions made twenty-seven years
apart by courts in Texas and California show how judges easily combined these three strands of
reasoning into a consistent rule. In sum, given the type of organization they perceived unions to be,
courts would at minimum not interfere with the decisions of government officials to avoid dealing
with them. Two cases, McNatt v. Lawther and Perez v. Board of Police Commissioners demonstrate
how judges synthesized the three factors into a remarkably constant body of law.
1. McNatt v. Lawther
In 1920 the Texas court of appeals in McNatt upheld a bar on union affiliation by firefighters.
Showing concern for the capacity of state bodies, the court deferred to the local board of
commissioners in labor matters. The board could decide what constituted "cause for removal" and
court review of board decisions was limited or nonexistent. n188 Demonstrating palpable
skepticism toward labor, the court quoted a private sector case for the proposition that "an employer
cannot have undivided fidelity, loyalty, and devotion to his interests from an employee who has
given to an association right to control his conduct." n189 A "man who is by agreement ... shackled
in his faculties - even his freedom of will - may well be considered less useful or less desirable by
some employers than if free and untrammeled." n190 Citing Coppage, the court stressed that all
employers should be able to decide if union membership "is consistent with the satisfactory
performance of the duties of employment." n191 Further, the court's construction of "union",
specifically the assumption that public sector unions would use all the tactics of private sector
unions, bolstered the conclusion. Despite the IAFF's disavowal of strikes, the court explained that
the board "may have taken into consideration the effect of the increased probability of strikes by the
policemen or firemen" if they were affiliated. n192
2. Perez v. Board of Police Commissioners
Even after World War II, little had changed. In 1947, Perez  [*1019]  upheld a ban on AFSCME
membership by the Los Angeles police department. n193 The union claimed that the ban was
unreasonable and arbitrary, and thus it exceeded the power of the board of police commissioners to
make "necessary and desirable rules and regulations." Moreover, the ban violated the federal and
state constitutions: it denied equal protection, free speech, assembly, and petition rights; it was
impermissible "class legislation" and a deprivation of property without due process. n194
Perez rejected these claims, refusing to compel government officials to deal with a union, as the
court understood the term. Echoing the biased "disloyalty" charge from an older era of private
sector cases, Perez approvingly quoted the city's argument that union membership could impair
police "independence ... where controversies exist between employers and employees ... a divided
responsibility would occur." n195 Second, the court rejected any construction of union not based on
the private sector model. It slighted the no-strike clause in AFSCME's constitution, insisting that
such rules could be amended, n196 even though it cited no example of an AFSCME police union
striking or threatening to strike. Third, due to its misperceptions of labor and workplace realities,
the court could not comprehend why government workers wanted or needed unions. "Nothing can
be gained by comparing public employment with private employment; there can be no analogy in
such a comparison." n197 This analysis made deference to another state body an easy solution.
Whether union membership related to competency was for the board of police commissioners to
decide. It was "not a judicial question." Reasonable rules must be held valid. n198 Given the court's
views on unions, it would be unreasonable to force public officials to deal with them.
Finally, the reply of Perez to the union's constitutional claims confirmed how little progress
public sector labor had made with judges in the first half of the century. In sweeping and dramatic
[*1020]  language, the court indicated that concerns of delegation and democracy could bar any
involvement by labor in government employment. While the union's argument "sings the praises of
the Constitution on the one hand ... it presages its destruction on the other." Allowing the union to
bargain would violate "the power of the people to establish and conduct the government, for it seeks
to control governmental processes by indirection .... The people have sought no assistance from the
labor union ...." n199 Allowing affiliation "would be a direct violation of the Constitution": public
workers served the people, and there could be "neither alienation nor division of this allegiance if
constitutional government is to continue." n200 Indeed, failure to prohibit affiliation "would have
amounted to a surrender of power, a dereliction of duty, and a relinquishment of supervision and
control over public servants ...." n201
3. The Remarkable Consistency and Longevity of the Synthesis
The logic of cases such as McNatt and Perez determined the outcome of all public sector labor
decisions in this era. Some opinions seemed to rely on the special nature of police and fire
departments, stating that they were in "a class apart." n202 For example, nearly thirty years after the
Boston strike, King v. Priest repeated the concern often voiced then that AFL police unions would
aid private sector strikers. The court took "judicial notice ... of the fact that members of one union
ordinarily refuse to cross the picket line of another union." n203
But cases involving public workers who were not involved in "public safety" yielded identical
results. The three factors blended together and did not distinguish between types of employees. The
AFT was a popular target of yellow dog rules, which judges upheld, n204 and indeed all types of
government employees  [*1021]  were, in various times and places, barred from union membership
and otherwise restricted by regulations and courts. n205 Fundamentally, no court in this period
struck down a yellow dog rule aimed at public workers or allowed them to strike or bargain. Well
past World War II, courts uniformly upheld whatever bans on public sector unions local authorities
thought to pass. They enforced yellow dog rules through the mid-1950s. Only in the late 1960s did
courts generally begin to find constitutional infirmities in such rules. n206
III
THE DOG THAT DIDN'T BARK IN THE NIGHT: FEDERALISM, FEAR, AND THE LACK OF
STATUTORY PROTECTIONS
The next logical question is, why was this area left to judges for so long? Why did public sector
unions not even begin to win some statutory protections in some states until decades after the
NLRA had given rights to private sector unions and other western democracies had given much
greater rights to public sector unions? n207 The absence of beneficial laws was clearly important.
n208 Yet while statutory law set wages and hours for government  [*1022]  employees, and civil
service rules sometimes provided rights to individual workers, neither federal nor state law gave
public sector unions institutional rights. Not only were such unions excluded from the coverage of
the NLRA, but state statutes, passed soon after World War II, did little beyond formally barring
public sector unions from striking.
Just as one theoretical tool is insufficient to understand judicial holdings decisions, the absence
of statutes also can be explained only by understanding how bias, state structure, and false
constructions combined. The long and difficult battles required to pass the NLRA show the power
of anti-union groups and ideology generally. n209 But why were public workers not included in the
NLRA or in state labor relations laws? First, federalism and the constitutional limits of
Congressional power over the states greatly limited the opportunities for a national labor statute
covering employees of states and local governments. Second, memories of the traumatic Boston
police strike of 1919, unique though it was, reinforced the idea that public sector unions would
inevitably act like private sector labor; this image helped prevent passage of beneficial state and
local statutes. Thus bias, false constructions, and state structure ensured their unions would receive
no institutional protections. n210
A. Laws, but Not Labor Relations Laws
Unions of government workers did help pass laws in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, but these generally were limited to wages and hours. n211 The lone statute that granted
any institutional rights to public sector unions was the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, and this was
limited to employees of the federal  [*1023]  government: because of the federalist structure of the
American state, a labor law covering the federal government did not extend to state and local
governments. n212 Practically speaking, Lloyd-LaFollette gave federal sector unions the right to
exist, petition Congress, and little else. n213 Unions in state and local government lacked even this
minimal form of statutory protection.
Civil service laws sometimes offered some rights to individual workers, but state structure and
bias assured that these laws would not protect unions. Civil service rules were designed to protect
merit principles: public workers should be hired, fired, promoted, or demoted because of their
abilities, not as favors or punishments by political machine bosses. By 1944 nineteen states had
adopted civil service systems, as had hundreds of cities. n214 Unions fought for these laws, and
used civil service procedures and hearings to defend their members. n215 Still, civil service rules
did not provide institutional rights for unions. Even though proponents and opponents of these rules
were fighting about how the state would be structured through its employment practices,  [*1024]
neither side had a brief for labor. Unions could pass civil service laws only with the aid of
government reformers, but reformers typically held the biased view that unions were simply another
improper power base that should be kept out of government. n216 Further, with the judicial
attitudes described above in full force, civil service provided even less protection than unions had
hoped. Even when civil service rules provided that public employers could discharge workers only
for "cause," courts allowed local officials to determine that union membership was adequate cause.
n217 These laws were no substitute for labor relations statutes.
Also, federalism strengthened the hand of the machine bosses that opposed civil service. The
federal government created a civil service system for its employees with the Pendleton Act of 1883.
But, given the diffuse structure of American government, individual states and cities set their own
civil service standards. This often allowed local political machines to write or administer rules such
that they in fact retained significant power. Many states accepted the merit principle in name only.
n218 Further, well beyond the civil service context, federalism would turn out to be an enormous
obstacle for public sector unions seeking statutory rights.
B. State Structure Redux: The Continuing Constitutional Impediment of Federalism and the
Absence of a National Law
1. The Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, Then and Now
Why did public sector unions not win any federal protections in the burst of national labor and
employment laws passed during the New Deal? The NLRA explicitly excluded public employees
from their coverage, n219 but the legislative history of the NLRA  [*1025]  does not explain this
exclusion. n220 Nor do histories of labor law or New Deal legislation, including those written after
the startling growth of modern public sector organizing, examine why New Deal initiatives did not
protect government workers. n221 Unionists in the 1930s periodically called for a federal statute
covering public sector labor relations. n222 In later years too, labor leaders decried the omission.
"Congress ... has made its share of blunders over the years," AFL-CIO President George Meany
wrote. "In the field of labor-management relations, one of the most grievous was the singling out of
farm workers and government workers for exclusion from the protection of the [NLRA]. By that
action the Congress trampled on the principle of equal justice under law." n223
A large part of the answer, at least as to national legislation, is the constitutional scope of the
federalist state structure. Under the constitutional doctrines regarding the division of power between
the federal and state governments that existed in the first half of the century, Congress simply
lacked the authority to regulate the labor relations of states and localities. Joseph Padway of the
AFL in 1942 admitted that "Congress clearly is without constitutional authority to regulate labor
relations between state governments and their subordinate bodies and all of their employees." n224
[*1026]  So, for example, in 1942 the National War Labor Board cited the "sovereign rights of state
and local governments" in holding that it did not have jurisdiction over a labor dispute between
New York City and the Transit Workers Union which represented public subway workers. n225
Indeed, in the 1930s, even the constitutionality of a federal statute governing private sector labor
relations was questioned. Employers insisted that the NLRA was beyond Congress's Commerce
Clause powers and violated the rights of states under the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court
rejected these claims in 1937, two years after the NLRA was enacted. n226 Since the New Deal,
courts have regularly upheld Congressional power to regulate private sector labor and employment
matters against such constitutional objections. n227
In the public sector, in contrast, federalism has been a crucial and continuing obstacle. Through
to the present day, courts have resisted Congressional attempts to apply federal employment laws to
state and local governments. The Supreme Court only grudgingly acknowledged the power of
Congress to regulate public employment as it has private employment in two brief and recent gaps.
First, between Maryland v. Wirtz n228 in 1968 (holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA) n229 applied to public workers) and National League of Cities v. Usery n230 in 1976
(reversing Wirtz and holding that the Tenth Amendment n231 barred Congress from applying the
FLSA to public workers); and then between Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
n232 in 1985 (reversing National League of Cities) and Alden  [*1027]  v. Maine in 1999 (limiting
the ability of state employees to sue under federal employment laws, relying on the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments). n233 This underscores the validity of the belief in the first half of the
century that a national public sector labor statute would have been held unconstitutional. It also
shows that issues of federalism have haunted government employees constantly throughout this
century. Thus, the new institutionalist emphasis on state structure not only helps answer the
relatively easy question of why federal law did not assist public workers in the 1930s, but also helps
answer the harder question of why no such law exists today. n234
2. State Structure and America's Exceptional Public Sector Law
The significance of the federalist structure of the American state is especially evident in light of
the legal regulation of government employment in other western democracies. The development of
American public sector labor law on such an entirely different track than private sector law is not at
all "natural"; it is in fact exceptional. Here, federalism hurt public employees in part because they
had no exclusive central government to lobby for rights. Again, while labor was successful in 1912
in passing the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, which at least on its face allowed federal workers to join
unions, this Act only applied to employees of the federal government, and not to any other public
employees.
In contrast, while governments in Britain and France hardly welcomed their public sector
unions, those unions won more rights and won them much earlier than did their counterparts in the
United States. In 1927, Britain barred unions of civil service  [*1028]  employees from affiliating
with labor organizations that had members in the private sector, but Britain repealed this bar in
1946. Moreover, beginning in the mid-1920s, British law provided for mandatory arbitration of
public sector labor disputes; such practices would not even begin to be used in parts of the United
States until nearly half a century later. n235 Overall, British laws and practices have not made the
sharp distinction between "public sector" and "private sector" labor law that has always existed in
America. n236 The French government in 1920 opposed state workers affiliating with the national
labor federation; but in 1924, pressure from civil servants forced a reversal of this policy. n237 The
French Constitution of 1946 specifically affirmed the right of public workers to join trade unions.
n238 Again, French law traditionally made no great distinction between public and private sector
workers, except for minor differences such as a requirement of giving notice before a strike. n239
Crucially, decisions in Britain and France were made and enacted on a national level. The state
structure of federalism thus ensured that statutory law would come from state and local
governments. At those levels, bias and false constructions would play an enormous role.
C. Bias and False Constructions Redux: The Strike Nightmare and the Absence of State and Local
Laws
Even assuming that public sector unions could not pass a national statute, why did it take so
long to begin passing favorable state and local laws? Federalism did not prevent state labor relations
acts from covering government employees. State structure still played a role, however. The
diffusion of governmental power within individual states combined with judicial deference to give
local government bodies dispositive power over labor relations.  [*1029]  This, in turn, gave bias
against unions a very specific context. Not surprisingly, local officials were biased against the
notion that their own workers needed unions, or should have the right to strike or bargain. n240
But neither state structure nor the bias of local officials is a sufficient explanation, especially for
the absence of laws on the state level. Again, the third factor was present: misunderstanding the
nature of public sector unions and exclusive use of the private sector model of what a union could
be. Crucial in this regard was the tumultuous but singular Boston police strike. The images it
spawned of unionized government workers wreaking havoc created a tide of highly restrictive state
and local laws that lasted nearly half a century. Public sector unions did not have the political
strength to reverse this tide; nor did their words and deeds dispel these false constructions of their
nature.
In direct response to the 1919 Boston strike, Congress barred police and firefighters in the
District of Columbia from striking or affiliating with unions. Many cities, including Macon,
Georgia; Omaha, Nebraska; San Antonio, Texas; and Roanoke, Virginia, soon followed suit,
prohibiting various public workers from joining unions. Massachusetts began enforcing an 1855 law
which barred firefighters from joining any organization not approved by government officials.
Similar regulations continued to be passed for decades. In 1932, Philadelphia enacted an ordinance
forbidding police to form any group other than a benefit society; in 1942, Dallas passed a rule
preventing city employees from forming a labor organization. After AFSCME began organizing
police in the early 1940s, many additional cities blocked this by law or department order, including
Chicago; Detroit; Los Angeles; St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri; Wichita, Kansas; Louisville,
Kentucky; and Jackson, Mississippi. n241
In this climate, while many states passed labor relations statutes ("Little Wagner Acts")
specifically for the purpose of covering groups of employees that the NLRA did not reach, these
laws either explicitly excluded or were interpreted to exclude public workers. For example, the New
York State Labor Relations Act  [*1030]  stated that it "shall not apply to the employees ... of the
State or of any political or civil subdivision or other agency thereof." n242 Thus, the New York
Labor Relations Board held the Act did not cover workers on the municipally owned Independent
Subway System in New York City. n243 Other "Little Wagner Acts" contained similar language.
n244 Moreover, as shown above, even when the text of a statute did not actually exclude public
workers, courts held that it should.
States finally began to pass laws which explicitly covered public sector unions after World War
II, but these statutes were mainly designed to provide draconian penalties for government workers
who struck. Such laws were partly inspired by the explosion of labor militancy in 1946, which
included some strikes by public workers, and were passed in the same era as the Taft-Hartley Act,
which restricted the activities of private sector unions. But again, the law restricted the acts and
rights of public sector unions much more significantly than it did private sector unions; and again,
the image of public sector unions in the courts and legislatures was generally at odds with the
traditional practices of public sector unions. Nonetheless, understanding "union" to mean only
organizations that struck, cities and states centered their attention almost exclusively on the strike
threat. Cities banning public sector strikes by ordinance included Bridgeport, Connecticut; Omaha,
Nebraska; and Portland, Maine. n245 States also enacted highly restrictive laws. In 1946, the
Virginia legislature adopted a joint resolution declaring it to be contrary to public policy for any
government official to recognize or negotiate with a public sector union. Virginia then enacted a
statute mandating discharge for any government worker who struck. New York's Condon-Wadlin
Act of 1947, passed after a successful strike by Buffalo public school teachers, not only banned
public sector strikes but also any employee participation in setting working conditions. That same
year, antistrike laws were passed in Washington, Nebraska, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Michigan,
Texas, and Ohio. The Texas law also explicitly prohibited public employers  [*1031]  from
bargaining with or recognizing unions. n246
While a few of these laws provided minimal rights to exist or to make appeals, n247 public
sector unions generally would have to wait until the 1960s and beyond for rights even approaching
what private sector unions had won before the NLRA. Even in the 1990s, barely over half the states
permitted collective bargaining, as it exists in the private sector, by government workers. Some
jurisdictions, such as Virginia, still prohibit any form of "recognition" of public sector unions. Only
thirteen states permit any public sector unions at all to strike. n248 This remarkably restrictive
modern law can only be explained by understanding the continuing power of the theme forged from
the three central factors of bias, state structure, and misconstruction of the concept of "union."
Given the type of organization legislators believe public sector unions must be, these lawmakers
have also been loathe to force government officials to deal with them.
 [*1032]   
IV
CONCLUSION: PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR LAW AND ECLECTIC LEGAL
HISTORIOGRAPHY
The history of public sector labor law is important on its own terms. It is important for the
impact it has had, both affirmatively and negatively. It artificially repressed the size of public sector
unions, and thus the size of the American labor movement. It is worth speculating how American
labor and politics might have been different but for the odd set of factors in the American state and
society that made public sector labor law so distinct from private sector law. n249
This field can also make a valuable contribution to legal history and historiography. It shows
that combining the valuable tools and methods of different theoretical schools can yield at least an
example of a somewhat more precise explanation of causation. This body of law cannot be
explained by one single and exclusive theme: judges disliking unions or judges simply following
established rules. But judicial concerns were identifiable and of limited number, and scholars need
not throw up their hands in despair of a coherent explanation. Also, scholars should not be afraid to
incorporate theories too often seen as necessarily distinct or competing. On the one hand, law is
almost certainly rarely, if ever, driven by one consideration, structure, or doctrine, internal or
external. On the other, "multi-causal" models need not be so inclusive as to be jumbled and
ultimately unhelpful. Some things can, and should, be explained, even in a world of complex,
multiple causation.
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